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1957] RECENT DECISIONS 447 
AGENCY -APPARENT AUTHORITY - LIABILITY OF CORPORATION ON UN-
AUTHORIZED NoTE OF GENERAL MANAGER-Welch, the general manager, 
executive vice-president, treasurer, and director of petitioner corporation, 
requested that respondent, a salesman employed by the corporation, loan 
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petitioner $25,000. Respondent complied, and Welch executed and deliv-
ered to respondent a note for the amount of the loan, signed by himself as 
vice-president and treasurer. After Welch had appropriated the money to 
his own uses, respondent obtained a judgment by confession against peti-
tioner on the note. On trial of a petition to open the judgment, held, dis-
missed. Welch.had acted with apparent authority in giving respondent 
petitioner's note, respondent had reasonably relied upon this appearance 
in accepting the note, and petitioner was therefore bound by the note. 
Petition of Mulco Products, Inc., (Del. 1956) 123 A. (2d) 95. 
The doctrine of "apparent authority" has been rationalized almost uni-
versally by the theory of estoppel in pais.1 Under this view a principal is 
estopped from denying the authority of an apparent agent because some 
manifestation by the principal has caused a third party to rely upon the 
authority of the agent. The elements necessary to create the estoppel are 
(a) act or negligence of the principal creating an appearance of authority 
in the agent; (b) actual reliance by a third party upon the appearance so 
created; (c) reasonableness of this reliance; (d) consequent detriment to 
the third party. A large body of case authority, however, has confused the 
theory of apparent authority with that of "implied authority,''2 so that 
··there are decisions which purport to rely upon apparent authority analysis, 
or which are cited as relying thereon, which fail to consider the reasonable 
appearance of the situation to the third party,3 or in which the facts lack 
the element of reliance4 or of detriment.5 The court in the principal case 
makes explicit and lucid distinction between apparent authority ·and im-
plied authority, 0 but fails to specify the reasons for its application of the 
former doctrine to the instant facts. Assuming that the court does not take 
into account the appearance of authority created by the representations of 
1 Because of certain minor technical difficulties in applying the rationale of estoppel 
there has been some effort on the part of a few students of agency to explain the results 
of the doctrine.of apparent authority on the basis of the objective theory of contracts. Sec 
Cook, "Agency by Estoppel," 5 CoL. L. REv. 36 (1905). But other authorities have repu-
diated this explanation, and the cases almost without exception ignore it. See MECHEM, 
AGENCY, 4th ed., §90 (1952). 
2 The confusion is especially pronounced in the Pennsylvania decisions, Williams v. 
Getty, 31 Pa. 461 (1858); Empire Implement Mfg. Co. v. Hench, 219 Pa. 135, 67 A. 995 
(1907); Bayne v. Proctor and Gamble Distributing Co., 87 Pa. Super. 195 (1926). Mechem 
.suggests confining use of the term "implied authority" to situations in which authority 
is actually conferred by the conduct of the parties (thus giving "implied" the same mean-
ing which it has in contract law), and using_ "incidental authority" to denote that authority 
which accompanies express authority to perform a particular act or occupy a particular 
status. See MECHEM, AGENCY, 4th ed., §43 and §§51 to 56 (1952) .. But almost all of the 
cases use "implied authority" to include both of these meanings. 
3 Shircliff v. Dixie Drive-In Theater, Inc., 7 Ill. App. (2d) 370, 129 N.E. (2d) 346. 
4 Groda v. American Stores Co., 315 Pa. 484, 173 A. 419 (1934); Farneth v. Commercial 
Credit Co., 313 Pa. 433, 169 A. 89 (1933). 
5 Williams v. Getty, note 2 supra. 
6 Principal case at 103 and 104. 
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Welch himself/ the only possible basis for an estoppel of petitioner is its 
act of placing Welch in his various corporate offices, notably that of general 
manager. It has been almost uniformly held that the general agent or 
manager of a corporation has, simply by virtue of his position, the reason-
able appearance of authority to do any act in the normal course of the cor-
poration's business other than to borrow money or execute negotiable in-
struments.8 It has also been generally held that a corporation president 
or general manager may acquire the apparent authority to borrow money 
or execute negotiable paper through a deceptive course of conduct on the 
part of the corporation.0 But the very few cases which hold the apparent 
authority of an officer to borrow money or make negotiable instruments 
solely on the basis of his corporate office10 are subject to criticism and of 
little value as authority for the proposition of the principal case.11 There 
is a good deal of authority to the effect that the position of general man-
ager carries with it the implied authority to borrow on behalf of the cor-
poration,12 but the court in the principal case makes quite clear the fact 
that it is willing to rest its decision upon the ground of apparent authority 
alone.13 In addition, there is much respectable authority denying the im-
7 There were in fact such representations, principal case at 101, but it is well settled 
that the estoppel of the principal must be based upon an appearance created by his own 
actions, rather than those of the apparent agent. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Thorn-
burgh, 187 Okla. 699, 106 P. (2d) 511 (1940). See also MECHEM, AGENCY, 4th ed., §94 
(1952). 
s E.g., Sheldon Petroleum Co. v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co., 112 Kan. 73, 209 P. 826 
(1922); Mass. Bonding and Ins. Co. v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 286 Mich. 179, 
281 N.W. 584 (1938). This class of cases, however, has been one of the major sources of 
the confusion of implied authority with apparent authority, so that there is not so much 
real support for the point as might at first appear. See O'Donnell v. Union Paving Co., 
121 Pa. Super. 68, 182 A. 709 (1936); Greenspon's Iron and Steel Co. v. Pecos Valley Gas 
Co., 4 W.W. Harr. (34 Del.) 567, 156 A. 350 (1931). 
o County First Nat. Bank v. Coast Dairies and Land Co., 46 Cal. App. (2d) 355, ll5 
P. (2d) 988 (1941); Sachs v. Ewing, (D.C. Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 403. See also American 
Nat. Bank v. Bartlett, (10th Cir. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 21. 
10 Arts, Inc. v. Bowles, (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1944) 38 A. (2d) 660; Bacon v. Montauk 
Brewing Co., 130 App. Div. 737, I 15 N.Y.S. 617 (1909); Barnard, Phillips Factors, Inc. v. 
Kaplan Silk Corp., 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 696 (1939). 
11 In the three-such cases found by the writer, note 10 supra, the officer was the 
president of the corporation. All were decisions of lower courts. In none did the court 
explore the problem, or give reasons for this part of its decision. Both New York cases 
were based upon very broad dicta found in earlier decisions involving third party bona 
fide holders of negotiable instruments executed by corporate officers. In one case the court 
assumed tl1at bad faith, rather than simple lack of reasonableness, would be necessary to 
preclude the recovery of the person who had accepted the instrument. Barnard, Phillips 
Factors, Inc. v. Kaplan Silk Corp., note IO supra. 
12 Glidden & Joy Varnish Co. v. Interstate Nat. Bank, (8th Cir. 1895) 69 F. 912. Hum-
phreys & Son, Inc. v. Broughton, 149 Va. 789, 141 S.E. 764 (1928). See also 2 FLETCHER, 
eve. CORP. (1954 ed.) §679. 
13 Principal case at 105. 
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·plied authority of a general manager to borrow money,u and a strong ma-
jority of the decisions reject any implied authority to execute negotiable 
paper when such action is not an ordinary feature of the business.15 Conse-
quently, in holding that his office alone is sufficient to vest a general manager 
with the appearance of authority to borrow money and make negotiable 
instruments for the corporation, the principal case amounts to a real ex-
tension of the doctrine of apparent authority. In view of the fact that this 
holding imposes upon the corporation a risk from which it has no way of 
protecting itself,10 it would seem that such an extension is not justified by 
policy considerations, for a contrary rule would merely subject the third 
party to a readily fulfilled duty of inquiry; 
Thomas A. Troyer 
14Alton Banking and Trust Co. v. Alton Building and L. Assn., 289 Ill. App. 177, 6 
N.E. (2d) 921 (1937); N.Y. Iron Mine v. First Nat. Bank of Negaunee, 39 Mich. 644 (1878). 
See also MECHEM, AcENCY, 4th ed., §68 (1952). 
15 See 2 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. (1954 ed.) §680, listing the authorities in various juris-
dictions. 
10 Under this rule the corporation must have the good fortune to choose a general 
manager not only completely honest, but also possessed of business judgment precisely 
corresponding to that of the board of directors, for no restriction that the board might 
place upon his authority will protect the corporation. The board would be providing 
for potential unlimited estoppel liability to third parties by its single act of appointing a 
general manager. 
